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VISIONS

am primarily an histo

stretched in quite different ways. Although much of what I
to nonoften intrinsically difficult for them to grasp, moa of .what I bring
intrinsically hfficult for them but requires them to resist the temp
legal history mainly in terms of legal doctrinal and institutionalWtters: Indeeqi, one a€&
questions current historians of law commonly ask is, why have lkgd e l k s typically ,,
conceived of the history of law from "inside" the law? If law students can getsufficiently
outside of the law to understand all that the question implies, they are well on the way
My main scholarly interest is the lustory of criminal justice in.England and h e f i c a
from medieval times to the present. The particular themes that dominate in yy sc$obhip
tend to appear with some (my students would say obsessive) frequency,in'my teaching.
They are certainly among the issues that my "multidisciplinary expertise" has led (and
perhaps even "helped) me to examine. Specificallp I have long been interested id two , ,
ideas regarding human freedom: political liberty and free will. Of the two, free will
been my main concern; my interest in it has often centered on its relationship to ideas and
practices associated with political liberty To give an illustratioi: one aspect of my long?
standing interest in the lustory of the criminal trial jury involves the community-based
1
attitudes that, via the j u q have sometimes served either to constrain or to expand state
power over individuals. Among those attitudes has been, at thnes, the belief (qr intuition)
that particular offenders did not possess the freedom -here,,mningp i r s ~ i dagency - 1
that the formal law assumed (or was taken to assume) was required for criminal convic
(or a certain level of punishment). At other times, formal legal rules 'that defined the
absence -or relative absence - of freedom, and, hence of mens yea, have seemed too
broad and have resulted in successful appeals to jurors to interpret the law narrowly an
thus to perform their "duty" of making those "truly responsible" for harm pay for their
wrongdoing. These divergent social perspectives regardin&criminal responsibility
existed in local communities and have been given &cf on an ad hoc basis, a proc
has resulted in institutional and doctrinal developmdt of differing kinds -so
reflecting resistance to the influence of "non-legal" ideas, some reflecting acqui
or actual acceptance of those ideas. Yet another closely related example: one of
interests in Anglo-American legal thought centers precisely on the role of ideas abo
freedom in the history of attempts to justify, criticize, or simply to explain the use of
trial. I have often employed analysis of that subject as lead-in to consideration of thin
past and present, of jurists and non-jurists, about many other legal doctrinal an
institutional problems regarding the relationship between human free will and
political liberty.
As an historian, I am more concerned with the history and present status of th
phenomena I have briefly encapsulated than with matters of "policy." I am not especi
confident that an historical perspective suggests how best to resolve present legal problems
regarding free will either to make the law more coherent or to reform it in order to make
life in an organized society more coherent, satisfymg, fair, or in any other way just. Not
that 1 regard those ends as unworthy; rather, my interest in the free will problem is related
to my belief that it defies resolution. The history of doctrinal, institutional, social, and
academic practice and debate regarding the free will issue - especially in relation to
'
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political liberty -is always enlightening. It is isalso-@,
amusing, depressing, orBagic dependmg on oneb mood of the
moment. It is, for better or worse, a part of history a d in my
view, a large part.
Thus, my study and teaching of history bear importaatly on
my study and teaching of law, for many and fairly obvious
reasons. For many years I taught Property and, not su'prisindy
1 often focused on the idea of individual initiative (or "labof)
that, in part, underlies (justifies) the idea of entitlement. This
commonly acceptedjustification often rests, at least implicitly,
on the notion of human free d l . Though the same result can
be reached on a purely utilitarian analysis, and that analysis is
sometimes invoked, the actual application of doctrine has
mainly been guided by slowly-evolving freedom-kd ideas that
are integral to our social and political culture and our group and
personal psychology. When, in teachmg a particular aspect of
property law, I moved from doctrinal analysis, per se, to
discussion of historical context, I tended to focus on one or
another s d of the history of social or political thought since
the late 17th century. 1sought in doing so to demonstrate the
degree to which the law is, in one of its guises, an aspect of
intellectual history, and to trace briefly g e evolution of those
ideas and interests that have served to contain the deterministic
side of modem thought and have underwritten lads claim through emphasis on human free will -to relative separation
h m sheer historical contingency. I should add (or confess)
that, although 1was origurally trained as a medievalist, I spent
relatively little time in class on the origins and early
development of estates and future interests; no doubt my
students suffered from too little focus on the relationship
between ideas about free will and the doctrine of springing uses.
But one can't do everything.
You might be wondering -if you are still reading this why I hught Property rather than Criminal Law, since the latter
corresponds directly to my field of research and writing. I have
hitherto avoided teaching Criminal Law precisely for the reason
I write about its history, that is, because it raises (for me at
least) the free will issue in an especially fundamental and
compekng, but totally perplexing way I have no solution to the
deepest problems that stmng doubts about the reality of human
free will pose for criminal law, in theory or in practice, and little
taste for replicating the linguistic and philosophical gymnastics
of the many criminal law scholars who have struggled in good
faith both to face the issue and yet avoid the conclusion that the
law (and life) is very possibly meaningless. At current rates,
such a conclusion might well seem unsatisfymg to many
students. As it happens, I shall begin teaching Criminal Law
next term. I am not sure what determined me to make that
twilight-of-career choice (not the dean, by the way) or exactly
how 1 am going to approach the course. If you are curious about
how it went, feel "free" to write me next summer.

